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RECOVERY FOR MENTAL SUFFERING FRoM BREACH OF CONTRACT
Introduction
The attempt to recover damages for mental suffering resulting
from a breach of contract has generally been met with disfavor by
the courts. Denial of damages is based upon several grounds:
e.g., remoteness of the injury from the breaching act; lack
of an adequate standard or measure of damages; the danger
of speculative and easily simulated injuries which would be
difficult to disprove; and the inevitable fear of increased
litigation. Yet despite the reasons advanced, mental damages are
considered to be a proper element in an action sounding in tort,
and resort is made to this latter theory by some courts in sus-
taining a recovery for mental suffering occasioned by breach of
contract.
The vast majority of contract actions are essentially commercial
transactions. In such cases recovery for mental suffering is
denied, even though it is conceded that there is some element of
mental anguish connected with the pecuniary loss.- Yet where the
injury entails more than a pecuniary loss, and the duty violated
is closely associated with the feelings and emotions of the in-
jured party, recovery for mental anguish has in some instances
been allowed. It is this relationship between the contract and the
personal interests of the injured party to which the courts have
directed their attention. The problem is one of proximate causa-
tion; that is, it must be shown that by the violation of the contract
the resultant mental sufferings were a foreseeable or direct result
of the breach. Hence the contracts to be examined in this Note
necessarily will be those that are essentially personal in nature.
There is little uniformity in the decided cases even where it is
conceded that the subject of the contract is personal to one of the
parties. Moreover, in those cases where a right to recover is
recognized, the rationale of the cases may differ widely. Conse-
quently, concise classification is not possible and any grouping is
to some extent arbitrary. The sections into which this Note is
divided are not mutually exclusive but rather they represent
areas of the subject which have been artifically isolated for
convenience of treatment.
1 See Pfeffer v. Ernst, 82 A.2d 763 (D.C. 1951).
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Injury to Domestic Interests
In one type of case, the courts are unanimous in awarding
damages for mental suffering unless the action has been abrogated
by statute. These cases concern breach of marriage contracts2
in which the form of the action is contract but tort is the basis for
recovery of damages. The recoverable damages are for humili-
ation, mortification, damaged reputation, and mental suffering.3
The right to damages is enforceable against the estate of the
breaching party, for the promise, although personal, merges with
the duty to pay damages on the breach.-
Another example of activity which has been regarded as being
of such a personal nature as to warrant relief for breach of
performance is the handling and custody of bodies of members of
the plaintiff's family. Recovery for mental suffering was per-
mitted where a mortician failed to keep a body in a vault* and
where a body was wrongfully withheld from the members of the
deceased's family.6 Similarly, when a mortician contracted to
conduct a funeral and failed to properly fulfill his obligation,
recovery for mental suffering was granted on the ground that the
personal nature of the contract was such that mental suffering
was a natural and probable result of its breach. It was reasoned
that the parties contracted with reference to that character of
damages, as mental satisfaction was the prime consideration
sought by the plaintiff and the very nature of the contract
imputed notice to the mortician that failure to competently dis-
charge that obligation would produce mental suffering. It was
concealed by the court that there was no substantial pecuniary
loss suffered by the plaintiff.7
The interest in security of person and property has been con-
sidered important enough to justify damages for mental suf-
2 See Thrush v. Fullhart, 230 Fed. 24 (4th Cir. 1915).
* Goddard v. Westcott, 82 MickL 180, 46 N.W. 242 (1890).
* Johnson v. Levy, 118 La. 447, 43 So. 46 (1907). The court held that the
damages were compensatory-for mental suffering-and could not be
punitive as punitive damages could not be enforced against a decendent's
estate according to the civil law.
5 Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536, 25 N.E. 822 (1890).
6 Kirksey v. Jernigan, 25 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950), the action was said to
be founded in tort and the acts of the defendant were held to imply
malice; thus punitive damages and damages for mental suiTering were
allowed. But cf. Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1930), re-
covery denied where there was no allegation of malice.
7 Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E2d 810 (1949). This case




fering when the contract concerns protection of these interests.
Thus where there was a failure to adequately repair a roof, caus-
ing water damage to the interior of a home, the court examined
both the contract and tort aspects of the case and concluded that
recovery should be granted on both theories." The contractual
duty was considered to be so coupled with matters of mental
concern that the mental anguish was a reasonable result of the
breach.
Other Protected Personal Interests
The right to privacy has been looked upon with increasing
favor by courts in the United States,9 and in order to adequately
protect this interest one court has allowed damages for the mental
suffering necessarily involved where the breach of contract re-
sults in an invasion of the right to privacy. In that case a profes-
sional photographer displayed a photograph of one of his cus-
tomers in his display window contrary to a prior agreement with
the customer, and the court allowed damages for mental suffer-
ing since the breach was alleged to be malicious and wanton.10
The court arrived at a just result but it confused the theories of
tort and contract by concluding that the breach was malicious.
The liability of innkeepers and those who maintain public re-
sorts is similar to that of common carriers, and the courts have
granted a similar right of recovery for mental damages resulting
from the breach of personal service contracts. Thus after accom-
modations were granted at a hotel and a guest was refused service
in the dining room, the court allowed a recovery for the resulting
embarrassment and humiliation."' The same remedy has been
granted for the expulsion of ticket holders from a public resort 2
8 F. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Murphy, 224 Ala. 655, 141 So.
630 (1932).
9 The first case which recognized the right of privacy in the United
States was Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68
(1905), for later cases see Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W2d 46
(1931); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941);
Meetze v. Associated Press, 95 S.E.2d 606 (S.C. 1956).
10 McCreery v. Miller's Grocerteria Co., 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1937).
11 Odom v. East Avenue Corp., 178 Misc. 363, 34 N.Y.S2d 312 (Sup. Ct.
1942), af'd mem., 264 App. Div. 985, 37 N.Y.S.2d 491 (4th Dep't 1942). But
see, Frank v. Justine Caterers, Inc., 271 App. Div. 980, 68 N.Y.S2d 198 (2d
Dep't 1947). Defendant caterer served food which poisoned plaintiffs
guests but recovery for mental anguish denied.
12 Aaron v. Ward, 203 N.Y. 351, 96 N.E. 736 (1911). But cf., Buenzle v.
Newport Amusement Ass'n, 29 R. I. 23, 68 Ati. 721 (1908).
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and a private club.' 3 The claim of malice or wantonness facilitated
recovery in these cases as the action sounded in tort where the
right to mental damages is generally accepted.' It is to be noted
that the allegation of malice or wantonness is an important point
in pleading this type of action. Accordingly where a hotel failed
to provide accommodations for the plaintiff who had previously
made reservations, recovery was not allowed' 5 but if the refusal
had been willful, the court indicated that a different question
would be presented.'
6
Further, the dishonoring of a negotiable instrument has been
held sufficiently personal in nature to warrant recovery for hu-
miliation and mental suffering where actual damages are found,' 7
but in the absence of special damages, the general rule that
recovery is disallowed for violations of a contract for the pay-
ment of money prevails.' 8 It therefore appears imperative to
allege actual damages such as. injury to one's credit standing,
or to allege that special expenses were incurred incident to the
contract to pay money, before a recovery is permissible.
A recovery for mental damages is allowed in actions on con-
tracts to procure medical treatment.' 9 The courts reason that the
prolonging of the physical pain is a basis for actual damages to
which mental anguish is then a proper incident. That the phy-
sician was detained by reason of rendering medical aid to
another is immaterial. 20
A final example of recovery for mental anguish alone, without
any allegation of other "actual" damage or willful and wanton
13 McClean v. University Club, 327 Mass. 68, 97 N.E.2d 174 (1951). The
court stated that the amount of damages should be the same whether
the case sounded in tort or contract.
'4 McCreery v. Miller's Grocerteria Co., 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1937).
'5 Kellogg v. Commodore Hotel, Inc., 187 Misc. 319, 64 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
16 Id. at 138.
'7 Westesen v. Olathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217, 240 Pac. 689 (1925). If
there are actual damages it is not necessary that the breach be willful or
wanton.-
38 State Natl Bank v. Rogers, 89 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1936); American Natl
Bank v. Morey, 113 Ky. 857, 69 S.W. 759 (1902) (dictum). But see, Smith v.
Sanborn State Bank, 147 Iowa 640, 126 N.W. 779 (1910) (even if actual
damages were found there could be no recovery for mental distress).
'9 Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664 (1915).
20 Adams v. Brosius, 69 Ore. 513, 139 Pac. 729, 731 (1914) (dictum).
The court held the patient's husband, the contracting party, could not




conduct, is a Michigan case 21 in which the plantiff, a person of
social prominance, planned to sail to Europe. Arrangements were
made with an express company to transport her luggage to the
pier. The trunk did not reach the pier and the plaintiff sailed
without it. Without her wardrobe, plaintiff was compelled to
remain in her stateroom and was unable to participate in the
social functions aboard ship. The contract was held to be personal
and recovery for mental suffering was allowed. The court arrived
at a just result as this was the only possible basis for compensa-
tion, since the plaintiff had suffered no pecuniary loss. This
rationale should be followed in the future in order to protect the
interests of those who rely on the services of others when they
cannot serve themselves.
The Common Carrier Cases
Anothe accepted area in which breach of a contractual
obligation has imposed liability for mental suffering occasioned
thereby is in the field of contracts with common carriers.
For example, the breach of a contract to provide a special
train to transport an ailing son for treatment was sufficient to
warrant damages for the grief suffered by the contracting
parent.22 Since the carrier was informed of the nature of the
contract, the consequent delay in transportation was termed
wanton negligence by the court. This is contrary to an earlier
decision in which the anxiety was said not to be within the
contemplation of the defendant when the contract was made.23
It is agreed that a passenger on a scheduled train can insist only
on the exercise of due diligence in the operation of the train to
prevent unreasonable delay.2 A public transportation utility can
be held liable for mental anguish unattended by physical injury
only when the utility undertakes to perform its contract; until
that time it is free to exculpate itself from its obligation and
will incur no liability. Thus where passengers were let off several
miles from a station and were forced to walk to their destination
during bad weather, recovery for mental suffering was granted.25
21 McConnell v. United States Express Co., 179 Mich. 522, 146 N.W. 428
(1914).
22 Burrus v. Nevada-California-Oregon Ry., 38 Nev. 156, 145 Pac. 926
(1915), appeal dismissed, 244 U.S. 103 (1917).
23 Wilcox v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 52 Fed. 264 (4th Cir. 1892).
24 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 141 Ga. 51, 80 S.E. 282 (1913).
The court refused to allow recovery for mental anguish because it was not
connected with a physical injury.
25 Brown and Wife v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 54 Wis.
342, 11 N.W. 356 (1882).
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But recovery was denied on the issue of proximate cause where
the alleged mental pain was suffered by a potential passenger
while waiting in the carrier's station.2 6 This result is unsatisfactory
because users of public transportation rely upon time schedules in
transacting or planning their affairs, on the assumption that the
carriers will transport goods and passengers in strict compliance
with their time tables.
The recovery of damages for injuries received by passengers
aboard common carriers has been a much litigated question and
recovery is frequently allowed for mental suffering. Disrespectful
treatment toward passengers by an employee of the common
carrier renders the carrier liable for "wounding" a person's
feelings as well as for actual damages for assult.27 Once again
it can be seen that reliance upon a theory of negligence in dis-
charging a duty to adequately care for and protect passengers
will allow the court to fully compensate for breach of a con-
tractual duty without being met with the defense that mental
suffering is no part of a breach of contract action.2 1
The Telegraph Cases
Historically, the first cases in which recovery for mental
suffering was allowed in an action for breach of contract in-
volved the failure to deliver telegrams in a timely manner.
The foundation case is So Relle v. Western Union Tel. Co.2 9
Where the subject of the message concerns a close personal inter-
est of the sender, some courts are willing to grant compensation.
For example where the anguish results from failure to receive
a death or sickness message in which the failure to deliver
causes mental distress, recovery has been granted,3 0 provided the
26 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Buckner, 89 Ark. 58, 115 S.W. 923
(1909). Plaintiff's fear that she would die of consumption because she
caught a cold while standing in the defendant's unheated waiting room
was not a proximate result of defendant's negligence.
27 Bleecker v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 50 Colo. 140, 114 Pac. 481 (1911).
The court granted recovery for mental suffering alone on a breach of
contract theory because a conductor iised insulting language toward the
plaintiff, a paid passenger.
28 Brown and Wife v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 54 Wis.
342, 11 N.W. 356 (1882).
29 55 Tex. 308 (1881).
30 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 163 Ala. 18, 50 So. 248 (1909);
Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N.W. 1 (1895); Young v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N.C. 370, 11 S.E. 1044 (1890); Wadsworth v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. 574 (1888); So Relle v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881).
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message indicated urgency.31 Likewise error in the transmission
of the report of a laboratory test was of sufficient severity to
cause compensable mental suffering.32 Mental agony which is
merely prolonged but not initially caused by the negligence of
the telegraph company may also be compensable as there is no
rational ground for a distinction between the two situations.
33
However there can be no recovery against a telegraph company
where the message concerns only a commercial transaction as
the only contemplated damages are pecuniary.
34
The theory upon which recovery has been granted for the
mental distress has varied widely. It has been advanced that
the duty of telegraph companies is parallel with that of a
quasi-public institution so that the duty itself does not arise
out of the private contract but rather is imposed by* law, and
that consequently the form of the action is immaterial.3 5 Others
maintain that the contract merely indicates the relation of the
parties and the action actually sounds in tort.
36
The claim that the measurement of compensation to be granted
might prove difficult to ascertainhas been rejected,3 7 and properly
so because the problem of computation of damages pervades
every field of law. The argument that the consequences of
permitting such claims might result in a flood of new litigation
has also been rejected3 s because the amount of litigation for the
recovery of mental damages alone is relatively scarce in those
states which allow such damages. Consequently, it appears that
the courts which permit recovery for breach of a telegraph con-
tract have provided sufficient safeguards to prevent the bringing
of simulated mental damage claims.
Pleading Willful and Wanton Negligence
Those jurisdictions which follow the strict view that recovery
for mental suffering is not permitted when suit is brought for
31 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Glover, 138 Ky. 500, 128 S.W. 587 (1910).
32 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930).
This was decided under a statute which permitted recovery against
telegraph companies.
33 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 163 Ala. 18, 50 So. 248 (1909).
34 Robinson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 452, 68 S.W. 656
(1902).
35 Cowan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 122 Iowa 379, 98 N.W. 281 (1904).
36 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 163 Ala. 18, 50 So. 248, 251 (1909).
37 See Cowan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 122 Iowa 379, 98 N.W. 281,
283-84 (1904).
38 Middleton v. Western Union Tel. Co., 183 Ala. 213, 62 So. 744 (1913).
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breach of a contract may allow recovery if the complaint alleges
an intentional tort. Consequently, if the wrong committed is not
alleged to be willful and malicious there can be no recovery.
The following cases exemplify this result: delay in the trans-
portation of a body for burial;3 9 failure to take photographs of
the deceased before burial;40 the loss of photographic negatives
taken of a child pending the child's death;41 and failure to make
insurance payments whereby the surviving spouse was com-
pelled to borrow funds to provide for the burial of her husband4 2
In all the above instances the agreements were contracts relating
to services to be rendered to a member of the complainant's
family or to activities that were incident thereto. If the complain-
ants in these cases had charged that the breach of the agreement
was willful or intentional,43 or had alleged some form of actual
damages, 44 it is believed that relief for mental anguish would
have been allowed. Query, whether the right to relief should
depend upon the form of the allegation or rather upon the
type of injury suffered?
A recent case45 concerned humiliation and mental suffering
of an acute nature arising out of unique circumstances. A stunt
man contracted with his employer for the re-enactment of the
famous Brinks robbery as an advertising scheme, one pro-
vision being that the employer was to notify the Omaha police
of the hoax. However, the employer breached his contract by
failing to give the required notice. Consequently the actor was
arrested and was confined for an hour and a half in the city jail.
The news of the arrest received national publicity.
In his complaint the actor alleged that he suffered shame,
humiliation and severe mental pain. The Nebraska Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff could not recover, on the familiar reasoning
that a recovery for mental suffering could not be based on the
39 Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913); Beaulieu v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907). Contra, Hale v.
Bonner, 82 Tex. 33, 17 SW. 605 (1891).
40 Plummer v. Hollis, 213 Ind. 43, 11 N.E.2d 140 (1937).
41 Thomason v. Hackney & Moale Co., 159 N.C. 299, 74 S.E. 1022 (1912).
The plaintiff was the mother of the deceased child, but the child's aunt
had made the contract, therefore, the court found that the mother's
mental pain was not contemplated by the defendant.
42 Clark v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 245 Ky. 579, 53 S.W.2d 968 (1932),
holding that there can be no recovery for mental damages in actions on
contract where such damages are not incident to some physical injury.
43 Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 255, 134 Pac. 151 (1913).
44 Beaulieu v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907).
45 Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).
19571
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
breach of an "ordinary" contract. The court reasoned that the
defendant-employer could not have anticipated at the time
the contract was executed that the plaintiff would suffer mental
pain if the contract were breached. The court also considered
the question of causation and determined that the mental suffer-
ing was not a natural result of the breach. Finally, the court
intimated that the plaintiff might well have gained more than he
lost because of the nationwide publicity-something the court
thought every actor would be more than happy to receive.
It is suggested that the reasons advanced for the denial of
mental damages in this case are absurd. First, when this
agreement was executed, it was foreseeable that if the local
law enforcement agencies were not notified the participants
in the promotion would surely be apprehended if not physically
injured as well. Furthermore, it was likewise within the
contemplation of the parties that humiliation would naturally
result from a confinement, no matter how short its duration,
and especially so when the misfortune received nationwide
publicity. Second, it was alleged that the actor suffered unem-
ployment for a period of eight months, which should have been
sufficient to constitute actual dainages, to which mental suf-
fering is an accepted incident of recovery under a tort theory.
Finally, while actors seek publicity by sundry means, it is sug-
gested that they do not normally seek publicity through in-
voluntary confinement in a jail. Though it is admitted that
unusual circumstances of this kind usually result in increased
financial gain to the actor by capitivating the public fancy,
nevertheless it is submitted that the mental suffering should
be determined by reference to the individual's personal sensi-
bilities and not offset by the insatiable interest of the general
public in this type of escapade. Although the actor did not plead
willful or wanton negligence in his complaint, the recovery
should have been granted as there was a breach of contract
which could only be described as grossly negligent.
Legislation
Arkansas and Wisconsin have overruled their case decisiong
denying recovery for mental suffering, by enacting legislation
providing for the recovery from telegraph companies for mental
damages for the negligent delivery or delay in the transmission
of messages. 46 Three other states have also enacted identical
46 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-1813 (1947); WiS. STAT § 182.019 (1955). The
latter limits recovery for mental anguish to $500.00.
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legislation.4 7 The state of Louisiana has passed the most com-
prehensive statute in this particular area. Article 1934 of the
Civil Code of Louisiana provides:
Where the contract has for its object the gratification of some in-
tellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or taste, or some
convenience or other legal gratification, although these are not
appreciated in money by the parties, yet damages are due for their
breach; a contract for a religious or charitable foundation, a promise
of marriage, or an engagement for a work of some of the fine arts,
are objects and examples of this rule.48
Referring to the examples set forth in this statute, it is apparent
that the legislature intended to compensate parties for damages
for personal discomfort or for the satisfaction of aesthetic desires.
Such was the nature of a contract in an early case4 9 where a
dressmaker was negligent in failing to provide dresses for a
wedding and the incident festivities. Compensation was allowed
for what was reasonably within the parties' contemplation,
which included disappointment and humiliation as a result of
being without a trousseau. There was no indication that the
court encountered any difficulty in determining the bride's
disappointment in terms of monetary compensation. Subse-
qently, the Louisiana court applied a literal interpretation to
the words "intellectual enjoyment" and "convenience" by ex-
tending the coverage of the statute to a breach of contract to
sell a house which was particularly suited to the purchaser's
taste. In this situation, the court found the object of the contract
to be the gratification of intellectual desire and convenience,
and consequently a recovery for disappointment was allowed; 50
however, a contract to place one's home in a first rate condition 5 '
and a contract to renovate a bathroom52 have been held not to
be directed towards intellectual satisfaction and therefore were
held not to be within the terms of the statute. It is difficult to
justify the distinction between the cases, for if the statutory terms
"gratification of intellectual enjoyment" and "some convenience"
apply to the purchase of a house, certainly these same factors
are present in desiring a present home to be improved to suit
the owner's tastes. Apparently the courts in the latter cases
found the contracts to be primarily concerned with a pecuniary
47 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 363.06 (1943); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176 (1937);
S. C. CODE ANN § 58-255 (1952).
48 LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1934 (3) (West 1952).
49 Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903).
50 Melson v. Woodruff, 23 So.2d 364 (La. 1945).
53 Lills v. Anderson, 21 So.2d 389 (La. 1945).
52 Baker v. Stamps, 82 So.2d 858 (La. 1955).
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interest, and for this reason, could find no gratification of in-
tellectual enjoyment in their performance.
Conclusion
It is submitted that protection should be afforded for a breach
of contract that is personal in nature or concerns the close
members of one's family. As stated in the introduction, mental
suffering is a proper element in tort, for mental suffering
is so intimately connected with the physical injury as to make
separation impracticable. The allowance of this item in tort and
the ability to reduce the claim to terms of money answers the
contention that the plaintiff must be entitled to damages on some
other recognized ground before compensation may be awarded
for mental suffering. The recovery should be independent of the
form of allegation and dependent only on the character of the
wrong suffered. As to the further restrictions that mental suf-
fering in the event of a breach must have been within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of execution or that
it must be a natural and direct result of the breach, it is sug-
gested that the courts have been much too strict in their
application of these general principles. It is apparent from com-
mon knowledge of human psychology that men are deeply
affected by feelings of humiliation, disappointment and frustra-
tion. Because all rational men have experienced these feelings
it cannot be doubted that they are aware of the possibility of
their fellow man suffering similar emotional distress. For this
reason, it seems the courts are far behind our present knowledge
of psychology when they refuse to allow compensation for
mental suffering on the ground that the parties did not con-
template such a result. This is particularly true of contracts
concerning personal services5 3 and close family relations. Finally,
the requirement of a willful or wanton breach is misleading and
a source of difficulty since it connotes wrongful conduct, the
remedy for which partakes of the nature of a penalty, whereas
the action brought is solely concerned with compensation. The
theory of retribution has no place in these contract actions.
One of the characteristics of the common law is its adaptability
to changing social conditions. This field has long been awaiting
its attention.
John F. Chmiel
53 See Carmichael v. Bell Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 21, 72 S.E. 619, 621 (1911), in
which it is recognized that parties may contract with reference to non-
pecuniary adjustment in the event of non-performance.
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